Secure key generation using an ultra-long fiber laser: transient analysis and experiment by Zadok, Avi et al.
Secure key generation using an ultra-long fiber 
laser: transient analysis and experiment 
Avi Zadok,1,* Jacob Scheuer,2 Jacob Sendowski,1 and Amnon Yariv1 
1Department of Applied Physics, California Institute of Technology, MC 128-95, 1200 E. California Blvd.,  
Pasadena, CA 91106, USA 
2School of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel  
*Corresponding author: avizadok@caltech.edu  
Abstract:  The secure distribution of a secret key is the weakest point of 
shared-key encryption protocols. While quantum key distribution schemes 
could theoretically provide unconditional security, their practical 
implementation remains technologically challenging. Here we provide an 
extended analysis and present an experimental support of a concept for a 
classical key generation system, based on establishing laser oscillation 
between two parties, which is realized using standard fiber-optic 
components. In our Ultra-long Fiber Laser (UFL) system, each user places 
a randomly chosen, spectrally selective mirror at his/her end of a fiber laser, 
with the two-mirror choice representing a key bit. We demonstrate the 
ability of each user to extract the mirror choice of the other using a simple 
analysis of the UFL signal, while an adversary can only reconstruct a small 
fraction of the key. The simplicity of this system renders it a promising 
alternative for practical key distribution in the optical domain.  
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1. Introduction  
The need for secure key distribution has created a large interest in physical-layer based 
cryptographic protocols, which may provide powerful complementary capabilities to those of 
the more traditional, information theory based coding systems [1, 2]. The most widely known 
example is that of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [3-20], in which the key is 
generated by measurements of the quantum mechanical properties of single photons. 
However, practical implantation of the idea is complicated [7-11]: technological challenges 
include the reliable, high yield generation of single photons [5, 16, 17], the compensation for 
fiber channel variations [5], and the development of low noise, single photon detectors 
operating at the telecommunication wavelength of 1550 nm [5, 18-20]. QKD is facing a major 
hurdle in overcoming fiber losses, which may not be compensated for using optical amplifiers 
[5]. Recently, the introduction of decoy states had allowed for the use of faint coherent pulses 
[12-14], and avalanche InGaAs photo-detectors were successfully used in GHz clock rate 
experiments [15]. Nonetheless, present day QKD demonstrations must rely on either 
complicated, sensitive detection schemes, or on sophisticated, cutting edge components [15, 
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19-20]. The quest for a simpler, classical secure key generation scheme therefore remains 
meaningful. 
Optical code division multiple access (OCDMA) schemes are often discussed in the 
context of secure communication (see for example [21, 22]). The decoding of OCDMA data 
requires prior knowledge of individual user codes. In many cases, the available code space is 
large enough to render a brute-force code search by an intruder impractical. However, as 
pointed out by Shake [23, 24], OCDMA techniques suffer from inherent security 
disadvantages. First, an OCDMA encoder using a fixed code represents a linear time-invariant 
(LTI) system [23]. If the encoder’s input waveform is ever compromised, an intruder can use 
standard linear analysis to solve for its impulse response [23]. Furthermore, OCDMA 
transmitters repeatedly broadcast the code itself over a large number of bits [23, 24]. An 
eavesdropper equipped with sophisticated detectors may tap the OCDMA network with a 
sufficient signal to noise ratio (SNR) to recover the code [23, 24]. Frequent code changes and 
a low power transmission can make the intruder’s task more difficult, though not impossible 
[23, 24]. 
Another promising scheme for secure optical communication is based on the 
synchronization of lasers in the chaotic regime [25]. On the transmitter side, a delayed, non-
linear current feedback loop is used to generate chaotic variations to the wavelength of a 
semiconductor laser diode [25]. The confidential message provides the initial condition of the 
feedback loop. That initial condition can be recovered using an identical laser diode and 
feedback loop on the receiver side [25]. The potential of the scheme was demonstrated by a 
field test, operating at multi gigabit per second (Gb/s) rates over 120 km of standard fiber 
[26]. One weakness of the system, however, is its dependence on a small number of hardware 
parameters which are difficult to reconfigure. An unauthorized user may reconstruct or 
commandeer a network receiver, and decode the confidential messages, while the legitimate 
users remain unaware of such an attack. Another previously proposed optical implementation 
of one-way functions was based on the speckle patterns generated by scattering in a random 
medium [27]. Although the cloning of scattering tokens is impossible [27], they must be 
physically distributed among legitimate users. 
The ultra-long fiber laser (UFL) [28] key distribution system described in this work is not 
algorithmically and absolutely secure, as QKD ideally would be. Such unconditional security, 
though, has not been a mandatory pre-requisite for the application of cryptosystems, as many 
public key encoding schemes rely on the computational difficulty of eavesdropping rather 
than on a security proof [29, 30]. Promising optical schemes achieved major practical benefits 
by allowing some relaxation of the unconditional security requirement of QKD. For example, 
Barbosa [31] had used mesoscopic coherent states in a proposed key generation scheme that is 
scalable to optical communication rates, and could allow for optical amplification. The UFL 
system further extends optical key generation towards the classical light regime. 
Consequently, it requires only readily available, low cost standard fiber-optic components, 
and its key-establishing rate decreases only linearly with distance [28]. While an intruder may, 
in principle, obtain some partial knowledge of the UFL generated key, this knowledge can be 
reduced by any arbitrary amount by means of relatively simple strategies, as discussed below. 
Unlike OCDMA transmitters, the UFL terminals do not broadcast a fixed code for extended 
periods, and the generation of subsequent key bits is uncorrelated. As opposed to chaos 
synchronization based architectures, an intruder may not introduce a replicated UFL terminal 
and remain undetected. 
In previous work [28], the UFL concept was introduced and a preliminary, steady state 
based security analysis was presented. In this paper, two significant advancements are 
provided. First, the security analysis is extended to include a more powerful adversary model, 
based on tapping into transient signals following the UFL switch on. Numerical simulations 
show that the UFL system is considerably more vulnerable to such transient-based attacks, 
than to eavesdropping at its steady state. Nevertheless, the security of the system can be 
restored using simple measures. Second, a first experimental demonstration of the UFL 
system is provided. In the experiment, two users separated by a 25 km long fiber link 
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generated a 1000 bit long key, with an error ratio of only 0.6%. The key generation rate was 
167 b/s. An intruder tapping the link could recover only 65% of the key bits, which provide 
him/her with only a marginal knowledge gain over random guessing. The extended security 
analysis and experimental demonstration substantiate the UFL system as a potential 
alternative strategy for secure key generation in the optical domain. The system may provide 
better security than that of other classical approaches, while its implementation is significantly 
simpler than that of QKD.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II briefly reiterates the principle 
of operation of the UFL system [28]. Numerical simulations and results are described in Sec. 
III, and the experimental work is presented in Sec. IV. A brief discussion is provided is Sec. 
V.      
2. Principle of operation 
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Fig. 1. (a).  Schematic of the UFL system. (b). Top: simulated steady state UFL spectra for the 
four possible combinations of mirror choices by Alice and Bob. The spectra for (0,1) and (1,0) 
mirror choices are distinguishable only in their weak spectral side lobes. Bottom: reflectivity 
profiles ( ) 20 ωr ,  ( ) 21 ωr  of ‘0’ and ‘1’ mirrors used in simulations: ( ) ( )ωΔω⋅=ω 20 sinc75.0r , 
( ) ( )[ ]ωΔω−ω⋅=ω
sepr
2
1 sinc75.0 , with a spectral width of GHz72 ⋅π=ωΔ , and a frequency 
separation of ( ) GHz522 01 ⋅π=−π≡ω ffsep . The EDFAs small signal gain, saturation power 
and noise figure are: dB17log10 010 =G  above transparency, dBm13=satP  and dB3=NF .  
A schematic of the UFL system is shown in Fig. 1(a). The system consists of a fiber link with 
a terminal at each end, one controlled by Alice and the other by Bob. Each terminal includes 
an Erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) and a set of two spectrally selective mirrors. The 
peak reflectivity frequencies of the two mirrors in the set are 0f  (mirror ‘0’), and 1f  (mirror 
‘1’). In each bit cycle, both Alice and Bob randomly choose one of the mirrors (‘0’ or ‘1’) as 
an end mirror of the UFL. The combination of mirror choices is identified through 
measurements of the UFL spectrum, and represents a single bit. Mirror choices (0,0) or (1,1) 
lead to oscillations near 0f  or 1f , respectively. An eavesdropper (Eve) measuring peak 
frequencies 0f  or 1f , can thus easily infer the corresponding mirror choices. These data are 
thus discarded. The choices (1,0) and (0,1) lead (both) to oscillation close to ( )1021 fffc +≡ . 
If Eve measures 
c
f , she can not easily determine which arrangement, (1,0) or (0,1), was used. 
Alice, knowing her own mirror choice, can determine the complementary choice of Bob, and 
vice versa. The two of them can therefore assign, for example, a logical ‘1’ to the choice of 
(1,0), and a logical ‘0’ to (0,1). The UFL principle of operation is analogous to the idea of 
“keyless cryptography”, proposed by Alpern and Schneider as early as 1983 [32]. In that 
scheme, Alice and Bob anonymously post their uncorrelated choices of binary strings on a 
public blackboard, and only they can recognize the generator of individual messages [32].  
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3. Numerical simulations 
We refer to the optical field propagating from Alice to Bob as ( )ω+E , ω  denoting the optical 
frequency, and to the field propagating from Bob to Alice is ( )ω
−
E . The fields are normalized 
so that the integral ( ) ωω
∫
± d
2
E  represents optical power. The EDFAs used in both terminals 
are assumed to be identical, characterized by their small signal gain coefficient 0G , saturation 
output power 
satP and noise figure NF . ( )ωAr  and ( )ωBr  are the spectral reflectance profiles 
of the mirrors chosen by Alice and Bob, respectively. The fiber spans connecting the two 
terminals are both of length L , and have the same propagation constant β .   
The build-up of the lasing signal within the UFL following switch-on may be evaluated by 
the following set of iterative, coupled equations [28]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ω+ωβ−ω=ω +−++ slAll EGrLjEE 2expexp1  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ω+ωβ−ω=ω
−+
+
− s
l
B
ll EGrLjEE 2expexp1  
(1) 
In Eq. (1), ( )ω±lE  denote the optical fields in both directions of propagation, following l  one 
way trips within the UFL. The gain coefficients lG±  are determined by the overall input power 
of the EDFAs:  
( )
sat
l
l
PE
GG
∫
ωω+
=±
d1
2
0
∓
 
(2) 
The gain coefficients are assumed to be frequency independent within the reflectivity 
windows of the mirrors. This is a reasonable assumption, since the reflectivity bandwidths of 
the mirrors employed in the experiments are below 0.05 nm. The additive term ( )ω
s
E  in Eq. 
(1) represents the random phase optical field of the Amplified Spontaneous Emission (ASE) 
of the EDFAs. The power of the ASE field within a frequency window of width ωd  is 
assumed to be independent of ω:  
( ) ( )[ ] ω⋅−⋅=ωω ± dGNFhvEs 1expd2  (3) 
Here, hv is the energy of a single photon, and lG±  are used in the evaluation of ( )ω±lE .  
Figure 1(b) shows examples of the simulated UFL steady state spectra ( ) ( ) ωω≡ω ++ dEP l 2 , 
1>>l , for the four possible combinations of mirror choices. When the choices of mirrors are 
(0,0) or (1,1), the central lasing frequency is 0f  or 1f , correspondingly. The spectra obtained 
for (1,0) and (0,1) mirror choices, representing ‘1’ and ‘0’ bits, are both centered at 
c
f and 
their main lobes are identical. In order to distinguish between the two, Eve must examine the 
spectral side lobes, whose steady state power is 60 dB lower than that of the main lobe. The 
difference in the available signal power sets an inherent imbalance between the task of Alice 
and Bob and that of Eve, as one-way functions do in public key, data encoding schemes [29, 
30].    
Our previous analysis of the UFL security was restricted to its steady state operation [28]. 
However, a close examination of the build up phase of the UFL following switch-on reveals 
that the power within the side-lobes is higher, and their asymmetry is more pronounced, than 
at steady state. Figure 2(a) shows simulated plots of ( ) ωω+ d2lE  for (0,1) mirror choice, 
generating a ‘0’ bit, for different values of l  following the UFL switch-on. During the few 
initial propagation cycles, these spectra bear a residual signature of Alice’s choice of mirror, 
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and hence the key bit. This signature decreases gradually as the UFL approaches steady state. 
Even though these spectrally asymmetric transient signals are weak, they could disclose the 
key to Eve, and care must be taken to conceal them.  
For example, Eve can use the difference in optical power between the first left hand 
spectral side lobe and the first right hand side lobe as her decision variable EV . Figure 2(b) 
shows simulated probability distribution functions of EV , taken 3 ms following the switch-on 
of a 25 km long UFL, for (0,1) and (1,0) mirror choices. Let us denote these functions as 
( )EVP01  and ( )EVP10 , respectively. Here, EV  is normalized by the mean side lobe power. In 
order to quantify the performance of Eve’s attack, we assume that Eve has a prior knowledge 
of the distributions in Fig. 2(b). For each reading of her variable, Eve would guess that the 
particular bit was ‘0’ if ( ) ( )EE VPVP 1001 > , and vice versa. This decision criterion was shown to 
be optimal for binary data in the presence of noise [33]. In the ideal case of equal histograms, 
Eve would guess correctly only 50% of the bits, whereas if the histograms are entirely non-
overlapping she can obtain 100% of the bits. In Fig. 2(b), ( )EVP01  and ( )EVP10  overlap only 
minimally, and Eve can correctly identify 95% of the bits.  
We assume that Eve has a shot-noise limited detector, that her detection bandwidth 
optimally matches the spectral width of the side-lobes, and that she is using the entire rise 
time of the UFL to average out the measurement noise. We further assume that Eve can tap 
10% of the UFL power undetected, even though our experiments show that such power losses 
can be identified by Alice and Bob. Subject to this model, simulations show that the mean 
value of EV  is 20 dB above the shot noise equivalent power, and 30 dB above the level of the 
beat noise among the multiple UFL modes and the amplified spontaneous emission of the 
EDFAs. Therefore, an attack strategy based on the asymmetry of time resolved spectra is 
feasible and poses a relevant threat. 
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Fig. 2. (a). Simulated time resolved spectra of the UFL signal, with mirrors choice of (0,1) 
corresponding to a ‘0’ bit. The spectra were calculated after 3 (red), 6 (magenta) and 10 (blue) 
one-way propagation cycles following the UFL switch-on. (b). Simulated histograms of the 
difference between the power in the left hand side lobe and that of the right hand side-lobe, 3 
ms following switch-on of a 25 km long UFL. Using such time-resolved spectral 
measurements, Eve can recover 95% of the key. 
 
In response to this adversary model, Alice and Bob can improve the security of the UFL 
engaging several strategies: First, a narrow-band, intermediate spectral filter, with a central 
frequency of 
c
f  and a bandwidth narrower than 01 ff − , may be added in each terminal [28]. 
The intermediate filter would lower the side-lobe power significantly. The amplifiers gain can 
be reduced close to the lasing threshold, limiting the available power in the link to the 
necessary minimum. In addition, Alice and Bob may introduce random, uncorrelated 
variations to the peak reflectivity frequency of their mirrors, within a limited span surrounding 
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their nominal values of either 0f  or 1f . Such frequency variations introduce uncertainties to 
the UFL time resolved spectra. Finally, an additive, broadband optical noise source can be 
coupled to the output of the terminals, in order to conceal the residual side-lobes. Even though 
some of these measures were proposed in previous work [28], their impact on time resolved 
spectra based attacks was not quantified. Using these techniques, we demonstrate next that the 
difference between the side lobe powers could become either random, or too weak to detect. 
The combination of lower EDFA gain, intermediate filters and random variations to the 
peak reflectivity frequencies leads to a substantial overlap between ( )EVP01  and ( )EVP10  (Fig. 
3(a)). Due to the mirror frequencies variations, Eve can only recover 75% of the key bits. In 
addition, the ratio of mean EV  to the shot noise equivalent power is reduced to 7 dB, and the 
ratio of mean EV  to the optical beat noise is lowered to 6 dB. Eve can try to reduce her error 
ratio by moving her spectral filters further away from the main lobe, making EV  less 
susceptible to mirror frequency variations. However, in doing so Eve’s measurement SNR 
would deteriorate even further. Eve’s partial knowledge can be reduced further with cascading 
several intermediate filters inside the terminals. For example, Eve can only recover 60% of 
the key if two filters are used (Fig. 3(b)). 
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Fig. 3. Simulated histograms of the difference between the power in the left hand side lobe and 
that of the right hand side-lobe, 3 ms following the switch-on of a 25 km long UFL. The 
terminals include intermediate narrowband filters, with a 3 dB full width of 2.5 GHz and a 20 
dB full width of 3.75 GHz. The small signal gain of the EDFAs was reduced to 
dB7log10 010 =G . In addition, the peak reflectivity frequencies of the mirrors were randomly 
varied between bits, within a range of 2.5 GHz surrounding the nominal values. (a). One filter 
included in each terminal. (b). Two filters cascaded in each terminal 
 
In the above numerical study, a bound on Eve’s partial knowledge of the UFL generated 
secret key is established, for a particular adversary model. In setting this bound, it has been 
assumed that Eve is only restricted by signal uncertainties introduced by Alice and Bob, and 
by the fundamental detection noise. Eve’s knowledge is strongly affected by the specific 
intermediate filter used by Alice and Bob. Perfectly sharp filters with a flat pass-band would 
reduce Eve’s knowledge of the key to zero. As illustrated in the specific numerical example, 
Eve’s knowledge can be restricted considerably with use of advanced, real-world achievable 
optical filters, such as auto-regressive moving-average filters [34]. Finally, privacy 
amplification techniques can be introduced to lower Eve’s knowledge of the key even further 
[35, 36].   
4. Experiment 
The experimental setup used in our UFL system demonstration is shown in Fig. 4(a). The 
spectrally selective mirrors are implemented by fiber Bragg gratings (FBGs). During each bit 
exchange cycle, the peak reflectivity frequencies of Alice’s and Bob’s FBGs is tension-tuned 
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to either 0f  or 1f . The frequency separation 01 ff −  is 3 GHz. The terminals are connected by 
two 25 km long spans of standard single-mode fiber. Eve’s tapping coupler is placed at the 
very beginning of the fiber span connected to Alice’s terminal output port. Each terminal is 
buffered from the fiber spans by a 2X2 voltage controlled optical switch. When the switches 
are set to reflection mode, the UFL is effectively split into two local loops at the terminals, 
with no light transmitted outside the terminals. This mode of operation is used for individually 
tuning the peak reflectivity frequencies of the FBGs to 0f  or 1f , while literally leaving Eve 
“in the dark”. Once the tuning is completed, the two switches are simultaneously set to 
transmission mode and the UFL is re-established. Light from a 30 nm wide, external noise 
source is coupled to the input of each EDFA, and the UFL is set to operate close to the lasing 
threshold. The peak reflectivity frequencies of both FBGs are randomly varied in between 
bits, within a range of ±500 MHz around either 0f  or 1f . The small signal gain, saturation 
power and noise figure of the terminals’ EDFAs are 20 dB, 13 dBm and 4.5 dB, respectively. 
The nominal peak reflection wavelength, peak power reflectivity and full width at half 
maximum of the FBG mirrors are 1549.9 nm, 0.75 and 6 GHz, respectively.  
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Fig. 4. (a). Experimental setup. (b). Detection scheme for calculating Alice, Bob, and Eve’s 
decision variables. Black solid lines indicate optical signals. Blue dashed lines indicate RF 
electrical signals. The red line indicated off-line software processing of the sampled data.  
(c). Measured steady state spectra of the UFL subject to all four combinations of mirror 
choices.  
 
Figure 4(b) shows the detection scheme used to generate the time dependent decision 
variables ( )tVAB  for Alice and Bob, and ( )tVE  for Eve. The UFL signal, emerging from either 
the analysis output ports of the terminals or from the eavesdropping coupler, is initially down-
converted to the Radio Frequency (RF) domain through heterodyne beating with an external 
tunable laser of optical frequency lof . The difference in frequencies clo ff −  is set to fall 
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within the bandwidth of a broadband detector. The detected photo-current is observed using 
an electrical RF spectrum analyzer, or processed further.  
Figure 4(c) shows the measured spectra of the UFL at all four possible mirror choices. The 
spectra for (1,0) and (0,1) choices are indistinguishable. Such a spectral reconstruction, 
however, requires many seconds. More realistically, Alice, Bob and Eve have to identify the 
key bit within several round-trip propagation cycles. To that end, the detector output 
waveform is filtered using an RF spectral window, with a pass-band of 5.6 – 7.2 GHz (see 
Fig. 4(b)). This filter eliminates the baseband terms, whose spectral width is of the order of 1 
GHz, from the detected signal. The signal at the filter output retains only the heterodyne 
beating term, the electrical power spectrum of which is proportional to the optical power 
spectrum of the UFL. That signal is down-converted again, using RF mixing with a voltage-
controlled oscillator, of frequency 5.6=VCOf GHz. Finally, the signal is amplified and filtered 
by a 300 MHz-wide low-pass filter, and sampled by a digitizing oscilloscope. The sequence of 
spectral down-conversion and filtering stages is equivalent to the application of a 600 MHz 
wide optical band pass filter, centered at a frequency VCOlo ff + . Such a narrow filter is 
unavailable to us in the optical domain. By tuning lof , different portions of the UFL spectrum 
are analyzed separately. 
For the generation of Alice or Bob’s decision variable ( )tVAB , lof  is tuned to satisfy 
cVCOlo fff =+ . Figure 5(a) shows ( )tVAB  for two different key bits, one with complementary 
mirror choices by Alice and Bob, and the other with identical choices. When the mirror 
choices of Alice and Bob are complementary, the UFL central frequency is close to 
c
f  and 
the magnitude of ( )tVAB  increases following the UFL switch-on. This build-up of the signal 
power is an indication of the secure generation of a single key bit. On the other hand, when 
Alice and Bob choose identical mirrors, the lasing frequency of either 0f  or 1f  is detuned 
from VCOlo ff + by approximately 1.5 GHz, and no build-up is observed in ( )tVAB . Figure 5(b) 
shows the histograms of the root-mean-square (RMS) values of ( )ms3=tVAB , for 1000 
random bits. As seen in the figure, a clear distinction between securely generated bits and 
those who should be discarded is established. The probability of Alice or Bob making a wrong 
decision is 0.006. 
Eve’s decision variable ( )tVE  is calculated by detuning the local oscillator from VCOc ff −  
by a frequency offset fΔ , in attempt to recover residual spectral asymmetries. Figure 6 shows 
the histograms of the RMS value of ( )ms3=tVE for 1000 bits. As seen in the figure, the 
ranges of Eve’s decision variable for (1,0) and (0,1) choice bits overlap almost entirely. Eve’s 
error probability was 30-40% for all examined values of fΔ  and t . The range of fΔ  was 
restricted to ±1 GHz by the noise floor of our detection scheme.   
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Fig. 5. (a). Alice and Bob’s decision variable ( )tVAB , versus time following switch-on. 
Significant signal power is observed when Alice and Bob share a secure key bit (blue, 
complementary mirror choices), no signal is observed when information represented by mirror 
choices is non-secure (green, identical mirror choices). (b). Histogram of the RMS value of 
( )tVAB , taken 3 ms after the switch-on of the UFL. Blue: the decision variable distribution for 
secure bits, (1,0) and (0,1) mirror choices. Red: the distribution for non-secure bits, (1,1) and 
(0,0) choices. Setting a threshold value for ( )tVAB , 994 out of 1000 bits are properly 
categorized. 
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Fig. 6. Histogram of the RMS value of Eve’s decision variable ( )ms3=tVE , with a spectral 
detuning of fΔ  = 600 MHz Blue: 500 different ‘0’ bits. Red: 500 different ‘1’ bits.  
5. Summary  
In this work, the security analysis of the UFL system is extended to include an attack based on 
time resolved spectral asymmetries. This specific attack strategy takes advantage of an 
inherent weak point of the UFL approach - its spectrally asymmetric build up phase. 
Nonetheless, numerical simulations show that the security of the key generation can be 
maintained in the presence of this attack strategy through the inclusion of intermediate filters 
and random mirror frequency variations. Even with his strategy Eve can only marginally 
increase her knowledge of the key (~10%). The robustness of system against time / frequency 
domain attacks is also demonstrated in the proof of concept experiment. 
The experimental key generation rate of 167 b/s is relatively modest, compared with that 
achieved in recent QKD demonstration [19, 20]. While the UFL system is at a disadvantage 
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over the relatively short distance of 25 km, its key generation rate decays only linearly with 
the link length, rather than exponentially [28]. The UFL key generation rate could be superior 
to that of QKD over very long links [28]. As a non-quantum based system, the usable distance 
of the UFL may be increased with off-the-shelf, inline EDFA modules. The duration of the 
UFL build-up period, however, would grow linearly with the length of the link. A longer link 
would therefore provide Eve with a longer averaging time for her measurements, and hence 
improve her SNR. In order to maintain a given security performance over a longer link, it is 
anticipated that Alice and Bob would need to employ more elaborate intermediate filters in 
their terminals, or cascade a larger number of such filters. While this requirement may raise 
the system cost and complexity, the solution paths are nevertheless feasible. Each terminal 
may also be equipped with a larger set of mirrors (more than two), enabling the generation of 
a multi-level key rather than a binary one. 
Other intrusion strategies are of course possible. For example, Eve may try to actively 
probe the spectral reflectivity of Alice and Bob’s mirrors, by injecting pulses at the terminal 
input and observing them at its output (see Fig. 4(a)). In propagation through the terminal, 
however, Eve’s probe pulses are exposed to Alice and Bob. Due to the presence of 
intermediate filters and additive noise sources, Alice and Bob’s signal to noise ratio in 
identifying such pulses will be far superior to that of Eve’s measurements. Note also that the 
optical circulators prevent Eve from measuring counter-propagating signals (see Fig. 4(a)). In 
yet another potential approach, Eve may obtain a set of mirrors identical to those of Alice and 
Bob, and reconstruct a replica of the UFL terminals. Eve can try and direct a tapped portion of 
Alice’s output signal, for example, into her own terminal, and introduce a secondary cavity.  
Studying the oscillations in this secondary cavity, Eve may gain information on Alice’s choice 
of mirror. However, if Eve’s choice of mirror does not match that of Bob, the UFL 
oscillations in the main cavity will be altered and expose her attack. In this respect, the UFL 
system is advantageous over chaos synchronization based systems [25]. In addition, the robust 
UFL signals are unlikely to be affected by neighboring wavelength division multiplexing 
channels, sharing the same fiber link.   
From a theoretical standpoint, the UFL may be viewed as an optical implementation of an 
imperfect isotropic channel [32, 37]. An intruder into an isotropic channel can identify the 
sender of a public message with a probability ρ that is bound below 1 [37]. It was 
theoretically argued that the eavesdropper information gain in an imperfect isotropic channel 
can be made arbitrarily small [37]. Since the UFL concept is non-quantum based, setting an 
upper bound on ρ would be adversary model dependent. In this work, it has been 
demonstrated that ρ can be effectively bound below 1 when facing a time / frequency domain 
attack. However, the attack strategies surveyed above are by no means exhaustive. The 
quantitative analysis of substantially different attack approaches may have to start from first 
principles.  
Much further work is required in order to fully quantify the extent of security provided by 
the UFL concept. Nevertheless, the extended analysis and the first experiment provide a major 
step in advancing this approach from an idea towards a system. The UFL would be 
considerably simpler to implement then QKD, and has potential to provide superior security 
to that of other classical optics approaches.     
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